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Three recent cases decided by the United States Supreme Court
are the latest in a series of contests concerned with the extent to which
state economic controls that restrain competition are preempted by fed-
eral antitrust laws. In New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co. I
and Rice v. Norman Williams Co. ,2 the Court upheld state statutes
which obstructed the antitrust goal of fostering competition. In Califor-
nia Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. ,1 how-
ever, the Court invalidated state legislation which called for wine
dealers to engage in resale price maintenance. Each of the three cases
involved a state legislative sanction of a horizontal combination of
wholesalers or retailers in trade associations. The Supreme Court has,
in effect, adopted a public policy that some of these combinations in
restraint of trade which receive state legislative sanction will be ap-
proved while others will be condemned.
This article attempts to reconcile the almost forty years of incon-
sistent Supreme Court decisions on one aspect of federal preemption-
the relationship between federal antitrust laws and state economic con-
trols.4 The primary source of confusion is the Supreme Court's deci-
* Professor, University of California, Berkeley, School of Business Administration.
B.S., 1945, University of Illinois; A.M., 1946, Ph.D., 1949, University of Chicago; J.D., 1951,
University of Chicago Law School.
1. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
2. 102 S. Ct. 3294 (1982).
3. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
4. "Economic controls" is used here as a collective term to include both the enforce-
ment of competition through antitrust laws and the direct governmental regulation of prices,
output, marketing methods, and entry. Federal preemption, as a general constitutional prin-
ciple relating national law to state law, applies equally to both of these classes of controls
and to instances in which antitrust and regulatory laws conffict. The objective here is to
develop a subset of reasoned, constitutional rules to guide application of the principle of
federal preemption to state economic controls. The primary quality required of such rules is
[255]
256 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 10:255
sion in Parker v. Brown.' In Parker, the Court held that Congress
impliedly created antitrust immunity for some state regulatory statutes
which conflict with the Sherman Act,6 thus establishing the so-called
"state action" defense.' The thesis of this study is that Parker violated
an important principle of preemption law under the Supremacy
Clause,' which mandates that a state law whose substance actually con-
fficts with national law is unenforceable. Furthermore, the Parker
opinion was confined to remedies available under the Sherman Act,
although the proper issue for determination was the remedies available
to enforce the Supremacy Clause. The comprehensive constitutional
approach of this study differs from that of most earlier commentators.
9
The outstanding characteristic of seventy-five years of decisions on
the relationship of the antitrust laws to conflicting state regulation is
the absence of briefed or oral argument on the meaning and applica-
tion of the Supremacy Clause. In the Supreme Court cases in which
conflict with the Sherman Act was raised, from Olsen v. Smith,10 in
that they be consistent with the particular constitutional clause and with each other. These
rules also must transcend the immediate result in the particular case. Consequently, they
must be sufficiently definite to avoid being subject either to the personal economic biases of
the majority of the judiciary or to that majority's political preferences for or against regula-
tion by national or state government. See H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS AND FUN-
DAMENTAL LAW 21 (1961).
5. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
6. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976 & Supp. V
1981)). For the purposes of this article, the phrase "antitrust laws" refers to the Sherman
Act, the Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)), and to various acts providing additions or exceptions to the first two
Acts. See Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 4, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
7. Since Parker, the "doctrine" of state action defense has been described as "murky
confusion" and as "a crazy guilt of disparate rationales and rubrics." Handler, Antitrust-
1978,78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1374 (1978), quoting Handler, Twenty-lburthAnnualAntitrust
Review, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 18 (1972). Professor Handler notes that the Supreme Court
has failed "to provide an analytical framework by which the disposition of future state ac-
tion cases can be predicted with at least a reasonable degree of certainty." Antitrust-1978,
supra at 1378.
8. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
9. The one earlier study centering on the constitutional issue is Note, Parker v. Brown:
A Preemption Analysis, 84 YALE L.J. 1164 (1975). For citations of earlier articles, see Han-
dler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown StateAction Doctrine, 76 CoLUM. L. REv. I
& n.3 (1976). The most recent analyses include P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW, ch. 2B (Supp.
1982); 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, ch. 2B (1978); Gebhart, Constitutional
Limits on State Regulatory andProtectionist Policies, 48 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 1351, 1374-78
(1979); HandlerAntitrust-1978, supra note 7, at 1374-88; Rogers, The StateAction Antitrust
Immunity, 49 U. COLO. L. REv. 147 (1978); Smith, Antitrust Immunity for State Action: A
Functional Approach, 31 BAYLOR L. REv. 263 (1979); Note, Parker v. Brown Revisited- The
State Action Doctrine after Goldfarb, Cantor and Bates, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 898 (1977).
10. 195 U.S. 332 (1904).
1904, into this decade, the Supremacy Clause was not discussed. In
some other cases of state regulation, even the conflict between state and
federal law was overlooked. For example, the constitutional challenges
to state resale price maintenance laws-before passage of the congres-
sional exemption in the Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act of 1937 11-were
based primarily on the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.12 In
spite of the Sherman Act proscription expounded in Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. 13 and bills for exemption debated in
almost every session of Congress since 1929,14 counsel in state action
cases failed to raise any issue of conflict with the Sherman Act, let
alone brief the applicability of the Supremacy Clause. The issue of
conflict between state and federal laws was finally raised in Schweg-
mann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp. 15 The nonexempt part of state
law on resale prices, which was found to conflict with the Sherman Act,
was held invalid, but even here the Court did not mention the constitu-
tional framework of the Supremacy Clause.
1 6
Despite this historical trend, proper analysis demonstrates that the
right conclusion to be drawn, based on a large body of established con-
stitutional law, is that there can be no state action defense to alleged
federal antitrust violations when state and federal law conflicts. Except
in antitrust cases, a federal court injunction against state officers has
long been one proper remedy when state statutes conflict with the Con-
11. Ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693 (1937) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § I; repealed 1975) (exempting
resale price maintenance when adopted pursuant to state statute).
12. See, e.g., Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 193-
94, 197 (1936). The Court in Old Dearborn did note the established limitation of the Sher-
man Act in this area, as exemplified by the Dr. Miles case, infra note 13, but it noted no
constitutional conflict between the state statutes and the Sherman Act. This may be ex-
plained in part by the narrow interpretation of the Commerce Clause at the time. See
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 236 (1936). Since the litigation centered on the constitu-
tionality of the intrastate aspects of the state statutes, no issues of possible direct effects on
interstate commerce were raised, and thus the possible effect of the Sherman Act was not in
question.
13. 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911) (vertical price fixing held illegal under § 1 of the Sherman
Act).
14. See, e.g., Price Fixing Bill- Hearings on HR 11 Before the House Rules Comm., 71st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1930); H.R. REP. No. 536, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930) (Report to accompany
H.R. 11); Capper-Kelly Fair-Trade Bill- Hearings on S. 97 Before the Senate Comm. On In-
terstate Commerce, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932); S. REP. No. 441, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
For a summary of these attempts to secure legislation, see FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N RE-
PORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE, 39-43 (1945).
15. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
16. In contrast, in the one reported resale price case in the state courts where the
Supremacy Clause issue was briefed, the conflicting state law was summarily held invalid.
See Grayson-Robinson Stores v. Oneida, Ltd., 209 Ga. 613, 75 S.E.2d 161 (1953).
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stitution and federal statutes. 17 Consequently, the view expressed
herein is that the Supreme Court decision in Parker, denying an in-
junction against state officers, is erroneous under any penetrating inter-
pretation of the language of the Supremacy Clause and of the Sherman
Act.
1 8
This article begins with an analysis of the Supremacy Clause, fol-
lowed by a review of the cases confirming the supremacy of the na-
tional antitrust laws. This is followed by a description of two broad
classes of state economic regulations that do not violate the Supremacy
Clause because they are consistent with the federal antitrust laws. The
next section presents an analysis of the Parker case and its impact in
the lower courts. The final section is a review of the recent Supreme
Court cases, culminating in the Norman Williams case.
It is critical to an understanding of national preemption under the
Supremacy Clause to distinguish it from antitrust defenses based on
congressional exemption.19 The analytical problems are different.
Federal preemption of state action is concerned with relations between
two governments-the constitutional problem of federalism. In con-
trast, congressional exemption is concerned with conflicting statutes
within a single government. Only the Congress has power to create
exemptions to its earlier legislation. Whether the exemption is express
or implied, the judicial issue only pertains to one limited sector of stat-
utory interpretation. Unfortunately, some writers have failed to distin-
guish the state action defense from the issue of congressional
exemption.2" This study is concerned only with the issue of federal
preemption of state action-an issue of constitutional interpretation.
17. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (upholding a dis-
trict court injunction against enforcement of Illinois statute held unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause).
18. The argument that Parker should be overruled derives from the basic method of
constitutional reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court, which centers on constitutional lan-
guage and contemporary rules of documentary interpretation. See 1 J. STORY, COMMENTA-
RIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, bk. III, ch. 5 (1891); Holmes, The
Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REv. 417 (1899). As Justice Frankfurter stated,
"[T]he ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we
have said about it." Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). See also M. CONANT, THE CONSTITUTION AND CAPITALISM, ch. 3 (1974);
Blaustein & Field, "Overruling" Opinions in the Supreme Court, 57 MICH. L. REv. 151
(1958).
19. Compare 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 9, at 214a and Handler, Anti-
trust-1978, supra note 7, at 1378 with Handler, The Current Attack on Parker v. Brown
State Action Doctrine, supra note 9, at 10.
20. See, e.g., Ludington, Valid Governmental Action as Conferring Immunity or Exemp-
tion from Private Liability Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 12 ALR FED. 329 (1972).
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I. Application of the Supremacy Clause
The doctrine of federal legislative preemption is based on the
Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution.21 In McCulloch v.
Maryland,2 Chief Justice Marshall stated that the consequence of this
clause is that "the States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to
retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the
constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the
powers vested in the general government."''2 Primacy of federal law is
the glue that bonds together a nation of diverse interest groups. It en-
sures that congressional policies will not be defeated by the states.
The Supremacy Clause is most easily applied to those powers be-
longing exclusively to the federal government, such as the war power24
and the power to coin money.25 The states are clearly precluded from
acting within these spheres of responsibility.26 More difficult problems
arise with the common or overlapping powers, such as taxation, and
with the shared powers, such as regulation of commerce, in which case
congressional action in a certain area excludes inconsistent state action.
On these subjects the states have acknowledged power to pass statutes,
but such statutes must not interfere or conflict with national laws or
treaties. As the Court held in Gibbons v. Ogden,'7 "In every such case,
the act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State,
though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield
to it.'
28
The application of the Supremacy Clause was reviewed recently in
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.'-9 In determining whether a federal statute
precludes similar state legislation, the first inquiry is whether the Con-
gress has either explicitly or implicitly declared that the federal power
is exclusive, and that the states are prohibited from regulating aspects
21. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
22. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
23. Id at 436.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cis. 1, 11-16.
25. Id at cl. 5.
26. See, e.g, Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875) (Federal congressional power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations under art. I, § 8, cl. 3 is exclusive).
27. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
28. Id at 211.
29. 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978) (hereinafter cited as ARCO). See also Malone v. White
Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978). See generally Note, Parker v. Brown: .4 Preemption
Anasis, supra note 9, at 1167-69.
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of the same topic. The Court in ARCO lists three instances in which
the Court will presume Congress intended to preclude state law and in
which, consequently, state statutes on the same topic will be totally ex-
cluded.30 The instances pertinent to this study, however, are those in
which the federal statute is nonexclusive, since the national antitrust
laws do not preclude state economic regulation.3
Where the general purposes of both state and federal statutes are
the same, the courts often will find that they supplement each other and
are not in conflict.32 The pertinent test was set forth in ARCO:
Even if Congress has not completely foreclosed state legislation
in a particular area, a state statute is void to the extent that it
actually conflicts with a valid federal statute. A conflict will be
found "where compliance with both federal and state regulations
is a physical impossibility". . or where the state "law stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress."33
Where both national and state legislation are validly operative in the
same field, the test of preemption is actual conflict in the language, pur-
poses, operation or necessary effect of the two statutes. 34 The courts
will try, however, to construe state laws so that no conflict with national
law is found. General principles of national policy will be interpreted
to except state laws that narrowly enforce legal rules which in some
minor aspect seem to conflict.
35
30. Federal statutes on a topic are exclusive if (1) the regulation is so pervasive that the
reasonable inference is that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it, (2) the
national interest is so dominant that the federal system will preclude enforcement of state
laws on the same subject, or (3) the object of the federal statute or the character of obliga-
tions imposed by it may direct exclusivity. 435 U.S. at 157-58 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Eleva-
tor Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
31. See infra, Section III, discussing state regulation that is consistent with federal anti-
trust laws.
32. Thus, the preemptive scope of copyright laws was narrowly construed to allow addi-
tional state protection against record piracy. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546
(1973). See also Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspetihes on Federalism and the
Burger Court, 75 COLuM. L. REV. 623 (1975).
33. 435 U.S. at 158 (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142-43 (1963) and Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (emphasis added).
34. McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 60 (1904). In ARCO, portions of the Wash-
ington Tanker Law were held to be in direct conflict with federal law, particularly the Ports
and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, and thus preempted thereby. 435 U.S. at 158-68, 173-78.
35. For example, it is a principle of federal patent law that all ideas in general circula-
tion are dedicated to the common good unless they are protected by a valid patent. See
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668 (1969). This principle, however, does not preempt
state trade secret laws allowing unfair competition actions against employees who violate
agreements not to reveal novel processes to others. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470 (1974). On the other hand, state unfair competition laws will not be allowed to
override the national patent laws and give comprehensive protection against the copying of
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The effect of intergovernmental comity is that there are no pre-
sumptions against state legislation on the same general subject matter
as national legislation. "Our system of government is a practical ad-
justment by which the National authority as conferred by the Constitu-
tion is maintained in its full scope without unnecessary loss of local
efficiency."3  Congress often does not expressly state in its legislation
that it thereby preempts state law because national and state laws on
the same subject can complement one another.3 7 However, if state law
conflicts with national law or would frustrate the federal scheme, it
must fall. 8
H. Supremacy of Federal Antitrust Laws
The quasi-constitutional character of the national antitrust laws
has been noted many times.39 It is most eloquently stated by Mr. Jus-
an article which has been judicially determined to be unpatentable. See Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S.
234 (1964).
36. The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 402 (1913).
37. See, eg., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143-46
(1963).
38. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); City of Burbank v. Lockheed
Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 377-84 (1978).
The issue of invalid state law may arise in litigation between private parties or in ac-
tions by or against the state. Theoretically, a declaratory judgment of invalid state law
should be available regardless of whether the defendant is a private party or the state. When
a person subjected to state regulation argues that it is unconstitutional because it is pre-
empted by national legislation, he may violate the state law and defend legal action on the
ground of federal preemption. The federal courts, however, do not require a party to subject
himself to irreparable damage or to criminal prosecution. The person or firms subject to
regulation may sue in federal court to enjoin enforcement of the state statute and the federal
courts may enjoin state statutes conflicting with national law. See Ray v. Atlantic Richield
Co. (ARCO), 435 U.S. 151, 156 (1978); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 523-24
(1977); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 157-58 (1963); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). The suit is not against the state government, but is against
state officials to enjoin enforcement of invalid law-a principle derived from cases challeng-
ing the constitutionality of state laws. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Exparte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
39. See, eg., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958), where Justice
Black notes: "The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on
the premise that the unrestrained inter-action of competitive forces will yield the best alloca-
tion of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest mate-
rial progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the
preservation of our democratic political and social institutions." See Appalachian Coals,
Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933); H.B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL AiNT-
TRUST POLICY 608 (1955); W. HAMILTON & I. TILL, ANTrrRUST IN ACTION, 119 (TNEC
Monograph No. 16, 1940).
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tice Marshall, as follows:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular,
are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to
the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise
system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamen-
tal personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and
every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete-
to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity
whatever economic muscle it can muster. Implicit in such free-
dom is the notion that it cannot be foreclosed with respect to one
sector of the economy because certain private citizens or groups
believe that such foreclosure might promote eater competition
in a more important sector of the economy.
The public regard for antitrust laws reflected in this conception of their
quasi-constitutional status would probably preclude total repeal of
these laws.
This almost impregnable aspect of antitrust legislation, however,
clearly applies only to the set of procompetitive statutes and not to an-
ticompetitive congressional exemptions. The antitrust laws are defined
in section 1 of the Clayton Act41 and in section 4 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act42 to include a few specific statutes designed to enforce
competition in the economy. It is essential to an understanding of the
application of federal preemption in the antitrust context to compre-
hend this limitation in the definition of antitrust laws. The only ex-
emption that is included in the statutory definition of the antitrust laws
is for labor organizations in section 6 of the Clayton Act.43 The anti-
trust laws, for example, do not include the section of the Interstate
Commerce Act which exempts from those laws railroad mergers ap-
proved by the Interstate Commerce Commission.' Nor do the antitrust
laws include those federal statutes designed to subsidize agriculture
through price supports and marketing quotas which cause certain
grain, cotton, tobacco, and peanut prices to be noncompetitive. 45 Even
the Miller-Tydings exemption to section 1 of the Sherman Act, which
promoted anticompetitive vertical price fixing and which was later re-
40. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
41. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976)). See Nash-
ville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 375-76 (1958).
42. Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1976)).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 17. This section gives antitrust immunity to labor organizations and
their members "lawfully carrying out" their "legitimate objects." Id
44. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, § 5, 24 Stat. 380 (1887) (codified as amended at
49 U.S.C. § 11343 (Supp. V 1981)).
45. E.g., Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, ch. 30, §§ 301-56, 52 Stat. 31 (1938)
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1301-59 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
pealed,46 was not included in the definition of antitrust laws. In fact,
though Congress has created many exemptions to the antitrust laws,
these are narrowly construed and will not be readily implied.4 7 One
can conclude that under the Supremacy Clause, state statutes must con-
form to the national antitrust laws in their unqualified form, unless a
federal enabling statute expressly permits state legislative exemptions.
The specific criteria of the federal antitrust laws, to which state law
must conform, are found in the language of the Sherman and Clayton
Acts and in the body of Supreme Court decisions which interpret these
statutes. While some minor inconsistencies do arise, especially from
the Robinson-Patman Act,48 the primary goal is the preservation of
competition.49 With the entire body of law framed in this goal, the laws
can be seen as a definitive indicium of congressional purpose for appli-
cation of the Supremacy Clause. The discretion of judges is limited.
They may not impose their own economic biases in determining which
state statutes are valid, as once was done in applying substantive due
process analysis to economic regulations."0 The few instances where the
46. Ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693 (1937),repealedby Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub.
L. No. 94-145, § 2, 89 Stat. 801.
47. See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979). See
also Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conf., 383 U.S. 213, 217-18 (1966), modfied, 383
U.S. 932 (1966); California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962).
48. Ch. 592, § 1, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982)). The Robinson-
Patman Act amended § 2 of the Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). This Act prohibits
certain forms of price discrimination but has been criticized as conflicting with the basic
competition theory of the Sherman Act. See generally Adelman, The Consistency of the
Robinson-PatmanAct, 6 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1953); Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme
Court: The Utah Pie Case, 77 YALE L.L 70 (1967); Dam, The Economics and Law of Price
Discrimination Herein of Three Regulatory Schemes, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1963).
49. Key language in sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act was based on the contempo-
rary common law. H.B. THORELLI, supra note 39, at 571. The essential meaning of restraint
of trade in 1890 was impairment of competition. See Santa Clara Mill & Lumber Co. v.
Hayes, 76 Cal. 387, 392, 18 P. 391, 393 (1888); Craft v. McConoughy, 79 IlM. 346, 350 (1875);
Anderson v. Jett, 89 Ky. 375, 380, 12 S.W. 670, 672 (1889); Gibbs v. Smith, 115 Mass. 592,
593 (1874); Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666, 672 (1880); Morris Run Coal
Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173, 183 (1871).
As to the use Congress made of common law terms in drafting the final statutory lan-
guage, Thorelli concludes: "The records of legislative debates furnish abundant proof that
the direct and specyfc aim of Congress was to eliminate and prevent restrictions on competi-
tion." H.B. THoRELL, supra note 39, at 571 (emphasis in original). See also, Bork, Legila-
tive Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & EcoN. 7 (1966).
50. See McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34. Justice Stewart and some commentators characterized the
present selective interdiction of some anticompetitive state regulatory statutes under indeter-
minate standards as analogous to substantive due process. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,
428 U.S. 579, 640 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and
Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLuM. L. REv. 328, 333 (1975); Note, Parker
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Supreme Court has stated inconsistently that the objective of antitrust
law is both to protect competition and to protect competitors from com-
petition must be considered aberrations from the general purposes indi-
cated by the statutory language.51
The federal antitrust laws are not so exclusive, however, that they
preclude all state economic controls. State statutes consistent with the
federal antitrust objectives of promoting competitive markets or cur-
tailing monopoly do not violate the Supremacy Clause. States may
thus pass and enforce antitrust laws for the enforcement of competition
in their intrastate commerce:52 Furthermore, even though such intra-
state commerce affects other states and is also subject to national con-
trol, a state antitrust prosecution is not precluded so long as it is not
inconsistent with a similar federal prosecution.
53
III. State Regulation Consistent with Federal Antitrust Laws
There are two large classes of state economic controls that entail
direct regulation of entry, price, or marketing policies of businesses,
and yet do not conflict with the national antitrust laws. They are
(1) state laws whose objective is to promote a competitive market result
or at least curtail monopoly power, and (2) state laws designed to pro-
tect public health and safety, which may necessarily result in some mi-
nor impediment to competition. Most state economic regulation falls
in these two categories and thus would not be voided by strict enforce-
ment of the Supremacy Clause.
v. Brown Revisited" The State Action Doctrine After Goldfarb, Cantor and Bates, supra note
9, at 931 (1977).
51. See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274-77 (1966); Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320, 344 (1962). For critiques of the anticompetitive
portions of these cases, see Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. at 281-304 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Bi-
son, The Von's Merger Case-Antitrust in Reverse, 55 GEO. L.J. 201 (1966); Peterman, The
Brown Shoe Case, 18 J.L. & ECON. 81 (1975); Turner, Conglomorate Mergers and Section 7
of the Clayton Act, 78 HI.v. L. REv. 1313, 1326 (1965); Comment, Criterlafor Determining
the Legality ofHorlzontalMergers: United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
653 (1967).
52. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Flood v. Kuhn, 443
F.2d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1971), aft'd 407 U.S. 258 (1972). See also Mosk, State Antitrust En-
forcement and Coordination with Federal Enforcement, 21 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. PROC.
358 (1962); Note, The Commerce Clause and State Antitrust Regulation, 61 COLUM. L. REv.
1469 (1961).
53. See Columbia Gas, Inc. v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 28 N.Y.2d 117,268
N.E.2d 790 (1971); State v. Sterling Theatres Co., 64 Wash. 2d 761, 394 P.2d 226 (1964).
A. State Regulation Promoting Competitive Results
The validity of state regulatory laws must first be judged by their
language. As long as the statutory language indicates that the purpose
is to preserve competition or to curtail monopoly, such laws are pre-
sumptively consistent with the antitrust laws. On the other hand, if the
language shows an anticompetitive purpose, it is inconsistent with fed-
eral antitrust laws. The second task of the courts is to weigh the opera-
tion and effects of state regulatory statutes and determine whether or
not the administration of these statutes conflicts with the federal anti-
trust laws.
There are many instances of state regulation which promote com-
petitive results. One such area is state regulation or operation of struc-
tural monopolies. A structural monopoly occurs when economies of
scale in a particular market dictate that one large firm can provide
more efficient service than a set of smaller competitors. 54 Examples of
structural monopolies include public utilities such as water, electric
power, gas, and telephone companies. A state may decide to operate
these utilities, or it may impose direct price and service regulation on
private firms." In either case, a monopoly is granted and competition
is prohibited. 56 But by setting rates of return at a level comparable to
those in competitive markets, the effects of this state regulation are
analogous to the effects of competitive markets.57 Thus, the objective
of allowing structural monopolies to earn only a "competitive" rate of
return is consistent with federal antitrust laws.5"
54. See K. Howe & E. RASMUSSEN, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 14-19
(1982); Stewart, Plant Size, Plant Factor, and the Shape of the Average Cost Function in Elec-
tric Power Generation: .4 Nonhomogeneous CapitalApproach, 10 BELL J. ECON. 549 (1979).
55. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 595-96 (1976). See also E. TROXEL,
ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 32-37 (1947); C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POL-
ICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 191-93 (1959).
56. Recently, some states have questioned whether economies of scale in certain utilities
markets still exist. California, for instance, has begun to encourage competition among util-
ity districts. See Advisory Committee Reports, District Reorganization Act, CAL. GOVT.
CODE §§ 56000-550 (West 1983).
57. Even though economists have questioned the efficiency of maximum rate regula-
tion, the policy objective is procompetitive. See Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. &
ECON. 55 (1968); Stigler & Friedland, WHAT CAN REGULATORS REGULATE? THE CASE OF
ELECTRICITY, 5 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1962). See generally Stigler, The Theory ofEconomic Regu-
lation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
58. Similar statutes, promulgated to limit market power in certain markets character-
ized by the presence of only a few sellers, were the bases of the public utility concept. While
some laws only required sellers to serve all who wished to buy their services without undue
price discrimination, see, eg., the original Interstate Commerce Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104,
24 Stat. 379, § 2, others subjected sellers to maximum price or rate regulation. See, e.g.,
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877), noting that: "It has been customary in England from
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There are other areas of state regulation, such as certain minimum
price regulations,59 that do not promote the aims of federal antitrust
laws. The failure to raise issues of facial or operational conffict in early
constitutional contests dealing with these regulations60 has left us with
many anticompetitive state laws.61
B. Health and Safety Regulations
Some state economic regulation, the clear purpose of which is to
protect public health and safety, also will be found to be consistent with
federal antitrust laws. Thus, a state monopoly in the sale of alcoholic
beverages could be rationalized as a health measure to control con-
sumption.62 State pure food laws, though they limit the supply of (im-
pure) food, are not primarily anticompetitive.63 State licensing of
doctors and other professionals, though a limit on entry, has as its pri-
mary objective the protection of the quality of services and presumably
will not violate the antitrust laws so long as large numbers of profes-
sionals are licensed and they do not conspire to restrain trade.'
The leading case on this topic for many years was Olsen v. Smith.65
A Texas statute licensed ship pilots and created a Board of Commis-
sioners to fix maximum charges for pilotage, examine pilots' qualifica-
tions, regulate their performance, hear complaints against them, and
suspend them. The lower court held that "[tihe object of such laws is to
protect life and property from the perils incident to navigation. ' 66 The
time immemorial, and in this country from its first colonization, to regulate ferries, common
carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, etc., and in so doing to fix a
maximum of charge to be made for services rendered, accommodations furnished, and arti-
cles sold." Id at 125 (emphasis added).
59. See, e.g., California Agricultural Prorate Act, 1933 Cal. Stat., ch. 754 (current ver-
sion at CAL. AGRIC. CODE §§ 59641-662 (West 1968)); California Stabilization and Market-
ing of Market Milk Act, CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 61801-812 (West Supp. 1983).
60. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). See general Gray, The Pass-
ing of the Public Utility Concept, 16 J. LAND & PUB. UTIL. ECON. 8 (1940).
62. See, e.g., Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895).
63. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 26520-537 (West Supp. 1983).
64. See Horowitz, The Economic Foundations of Self Regulation in Professions, in REG-
ULATING THE PROFESSIONS 3 (R. Blair & S. Rubin eds. 1980).
This rationale should not be generalized to all licensing statutes. Some may have little
or no value in controlling the quality of work and instead have monopoly profits for the
licensees as their primary aim. See M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, ch. 9 (1962);
W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT RESTRA\INT (1956); Donnem,
Federal An itrust Law Versus Anticompetitive State Regulation, 39 ANTITRUST L.J. 950, 953-
55 (1970); Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J.L. & ECON. 93 (1961).
65. 195 U.S. 332 (1904).
66. Olsen v. Smith, 68 S.W. 320, 322 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902) (citing Steamship Co. v.
Joliffe, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 450 (1864)).
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Supreme Court upheld this statute on the general basis of a state action
defense against enforcement of the Sherman Act. The statute was held
to be within "the class of powers which may be exercised by the states
until Congress has seen fit to act upon the subject."'67 The monopoly
which was created was held legal as, in effect, it was a direct outgrowth
of the state's power to regulate in this instance.68
IV. State Regulation in Conflict with Federal Antitrust Laws
Contrary to some Supreme Court rulings discussed below, 69 the
language and logic of the Supremacy Clause dictate that there can be
no general state action defense to enforcement of the federal antitrust
laws. Under the general principle stated in ARCO, 70 all state laws af-
fecting interstate commerce7' whose purpose or effect is anticompeti-
tive will conflict with the federal antitrust laws and, in effect, violate the
Supremacy Clause. It is obvious that under the preemption doctrine,
federal courts would be obliged to strike down any state statute declar-
ing that the federal antitrust laws were inapplicable in that state. Yet
state statutes negating federal antitrust laws and state statutes mandat-
ing anticompetitive behavior have essentially the same purposes and
effects. It follows from this that any state statute administering, com-
pelling, or approving cartel behavior, such as price fixing by private
firms whose commerce affects other states, should be held to violate the
Supremacy Clause.72
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Cor. 73 is the leading au-
thority condemning state statutes that in effect compel unwilling firms
to become members of state-approved, private price-fixing cartels. In
Schwegmann, the members of the cartel who had voluntarily signed
contracts to fix resale prices were exempt from the antitrust laws under
67. 195 U.S. at 341 (citing Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U.S. 572 (1881); Exparte McNeil,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 236 (1872); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852)).
68. See 195 U.S. at 344-45.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 82-114.
70. 435 U.S. 151 (1978); see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
71. As to the scope of the application of the Commerce Clause, see Hospital Bldg. Co.
v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976).
72. Courts should thus deny enforcement of state laws conflicting with national anti-
trust laws against persons and firms involved in interstate commerce. A corollary of this rule
is that persons or firms about to engage in competition in violation of a state anticompetitive
law should have a good cause of action for injunction against the state or its officers. See
supra note 38.
73. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
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the Miller-Tydings amendment to section 1 of the Sherman Act.74 Re-
quiring the nonsigning retailers to adopt the cartel price, however, had
the same market effect as would a horizontal agreement of nonsigners
to adopt the price.75 As the Supreme Court noted, "when a state com-
pels retailers to follow a parallel price policy, it demands private con-
duct which the Sherman Act forbids."76 Though obviously based on
the Supremacy Clause, there was no mention of the clause in this key
preemption decision.
If state compulsion of anticompetitive behavior is preempted by
federal antitrust laws, mere state approval of such behavior is surely
also forbidden. As Justice Stone said, "a state does not give immunity
to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it,
or by declaring that their action is lawful."
77
It is only a short step from state compulsion to join or follow a
cartel, as in Schwegmann, to state administration of cartels. As a mat-
ter of logic, there is no reason for the courts to treat state administra-
tion of what are essentially private cartels any differently from state
approved cartels. Regardless of public or private administration, the
monopolistic exploitation of consumers occurs and the principles of the
federal antitrust laws are violated. As will be seen below, however, this
logic was rejected by the Supreme Court.78
V. State Action Defenses
As a preliminary to a critique of Parker v. Brown,7" it is essential to
note that there is a valid state action defense to the antitrust laws for
states and their officials when acting in their governmental capacities as
regulators. This arises out of intergovernmental comity. The national
and state governments are coordinate regulators of private behavior.
When state law approves, commands, or directs supervision of behav-
ior that, standing alone, would violate the antitrust laws, the state and
state officials are not parties to the illegal combination. As regulators,
74. Ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693 (1937) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1), repealed by Consumer
Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-145, § 2, 89 Stat. 801. During its existence, the Act
created an antitrust exemption for "contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices for
the resale" of specified commodities when such contracts were legal under state law.
75. The Miller-Tydings Act expressly continued the prohibitions of the Sherman Act
against horizontal price fixing by firms at any functional level. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1937) (re-
pealed 1975).
76. 341 U.S. at 389.
77. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (citing Northern Secs. Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197, 322, 344-47 (1904)).
78. See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
79. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
the state and its officials may not be indicted under the criminal sec-
tions of the antitrust laws,"° and they may not be enjoined or sued for
treble damages under the civil sections of those laws.' For this cri-
tique, the distinction between an action for injunction under the Sher-
man Act and an action for injunction under the Rules of Civil
Procedure to enforce the Supremacy Clause is important.
A. Critique of Parker v. Brown
Parker v. Brown82 is the modem foundation of the state action de-
fense to the federal antitrust laws. It is also the classic case of a state-
administered cartel established at the urging of the regulated sellers.
8 3
In Parker, the Court tested the validity of the California Agricul-
tural Prorate Act,s4 a state-established price maintenance program for
agricultural commodities.8 5 The Prorate Act created an Agricultural
Prorate Commission which, upon petition of ten producers, appointed
a committee of producers to formulate a proration program. If ap-
proved by the commission and sixty-five percent of the producers, who
controlled at least fifty-one percent of the acreage in a crop, the pro-
gram would become law with criminal penalties for violation. Under
the program, producers were required to deliver seventy percent of
their output to the state Department of Agriculture, which disposed of
the goods in such manner as would stabilize prices.
Brown, a raisin producer, brought an action against the Prorate
Commission and the committee of producers to enjoin enforcement of
the raisin program. The complaint assailed the validity of the program
under the Commerce Clause, and the three-judge district court en-
80. Sherman Act §§ 1-2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976).
81. Injunction is issued pursuant to Sherman Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976). The treble
damage remedy was in Sherman Act § 7, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 210 (1890), superseded by Clayton
Act § 4, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976)). See Lowenstein v.
Evans, 69 F. 90 9 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895). The purpose of treble damages, in addition to deter-
rence, is to deprive violators of the antitrust laws of the fruits of their illegality, and to
compensate victims of antitrust violations for their injuries. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 720, 748 (1977) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
82. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
83. See id at 364.
84. 1933 Cal. Stat., ch. 754, amendedby 1935 Cal. Stat., chs. 471, 743; 1938 Extra Sess.,
ch. 6; 1939 Cal. Stat., chs. 363, 548, 894; 1941 Cal. Stat., chs. 603, 1150, 1186 (current version
at CAL. AGPic. CODE §§ 59641-662 (West 1968)).
85. Other acts maintained resale prices. See, ag., California Fair Trade Act, 1931 Cal.
Stat., ch. 278; 1933 Cal. Stat., ch. 260; Cal. Gen. Laws Ann., act 8782, ch. 843 (Deering 1937)
(as amended); 1941 Cal. Stat., ch. 526 (codified as amended at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 16900-905 (West 1964)), repealedby 1975 Cal. Stat., chs. 402, 429. All these were Depres-
sion statutes designed to install noncompetitive prices. See Sunbeam Corp. v. Wending, 185
F.2d 903, 905 (3d Cir. 1950), vacated on other grounds, 341 U.S. 944 (1951).
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joined it as a "direct and illegal interference with interstate com-
merce." 6  The Sherman Act had been noted in the amended
complaint, but antitrust issues were first briefed and heard on reargu-
ment in the Supreme Court. 7 The Justice Department filed a brief
amicus curiae arguing that the Sherman Act preempted the conflicting
state raisin program.8 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the raisin program: (1) was not an impermissible burden
on interstate commerce,8 9 (2) was not preempted by the Agricultural
Marketing Act of 1937,90 and (3) did not violate the Sherman Act.91
As to the Sherman Act, the bulk of Justice Stone's opinion was
devoted to the rule that state officers acting in a governmental regula-
tory capacity were immune from injunction under section 4. As noted
above, this is indisputable. Stone's explanation--that in part this de-
rives from an unexpressed legislative intent to immunize state of-
ficers92  was unnecessary, since their immunity is based on
intergovernmental comity. His other basis of decision was state sover-
eignty,93 and there he ignored the paramount position of the
Supremacy Clause in issues of federalism.
As to the substance of the state Act, the Court stated, "We may
assume for present purposes that the California prorate program would
violate the Sherman Act if it were organized and made effective solely
by virtue of a contract, combination or conspiracy of private persons,
individual or corporate."94 If the Court had used preemption analysis,
the opinion would have drawn to a quick conclusion. The California
statute was in actual conflict with the Sherman Act. Injunction against
state officials to enforce the Supremacy Clause was the appropriate
remedy.
95
While the Court admitted that a state cannot give immunity to
"those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate
86. Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895, 901 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
87. See Order for Reargument, 62 S. Ct. 1266 (1941).
88. See summary 87 L. Ed. 315, 321-22 (1943).
89. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at 368.
90. Id. at 358.
91. Id at 352.
92. "We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which sug-
gests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by
its legislature." Id at 350-51.
93. "In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are
sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an un-
expressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be
attributed to Congress." Id at 351.
94. Id at 350.
95. See supra note 38.
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it,"96 it held that command and supervision by the state creates an anti-
trust exemption. However, the Sherman Act contained no express ex-
emption for persons and firms violating its provisions under state
compulsion and supervision, and its language does not imply one.97
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act begin with the unambiguous word
"Every."98 Section 1 has been interpreted consistently with the word
"every" to hold all horizontal combinations to fix prices and other pri-
vate cartels illegal per se.99 No reasonable user of English would inter-
pret the statutory language to imply an antitrust exemption for
violators of the Sherman Act because their cartel was state imposed
and administered. On the basis of mere legislative omission, the
Supreme Court had no power to create one. Furthermore, the pre-
sumptions of our legal system are just the opposite. The Supremacy
Clause controls the relationship between federal and state law, not un-
expressed statutory intent. National statutes generally do not have sup-
plementary clauses prohibiting conflicting state statutes because they
are unnecessary. The Constitution obviates this task.
In Parker, there was no discussion by the Court of the language
and scope of the Supremacy Clause. The state action defense was ap-
proved with full knowledge that the state law was inconsistent with,
and contrary to, the mandate of competition in the Sherman Act.1c°
The Court noted that there were similar federal statutes protecting agri-
cultural prices in derogation of the Sherman Act. But this was not rele-
vant. Congress may create such exemptions to the antitrust laws as
required by political expediency. The states have no power to create
exemptions to federal statutes. That is the essence of the Supremacy
Clause.
96. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at 351.
97. On the presumptions against antitrust exemptions, see supra notes 41-47 and accom-
panying text.
98. "Sec. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations is
hereby declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
"Sec. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
99. See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980); United States v.
Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). In light of the
unswerving application of the per se illegality rule in price fixing cases both before and after
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), that case must be considered
a Depression aberration and without value as precedent.
100. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at 367-68.
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The Parker opinion also created confusion by incorrectly applying
its own standard for determining what level of state involvement would
trigger antitrust immunity. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice
Stone emphasized that state action immunity applied only to programs
actually administered by the state.101 Justice Stone also noted in dic-
tum that the state could not insulate persons and corporations from the
Sherman Act merely by authorizing them to engage in anticompetitive
behavior.102 A leading constitutional scholar has commented, how-
ever, that in Parker
[t]he central role played by private producers in both triggering
and approving the organization of a marketing scheme under the
California program makes it difficult to distinguish the case from
one in which the state has merely attempted to authorize private
conduct violative of the Sherman Act, something a state clearly
cannot do.1
0 3
Thus, while Justice Stone emphasized state control, in fact the state
control under the Prorate Act was, and is to this day, a facade."° The
industry was governed by the producers to the detriment of consumers.
While the Parker opinion ruled only on the raisin program, the
effect of the decision was to create standing law on antitrust immunity
that is now known as the "Parker doctrine." 1°5 Following Parker v.
Brown, a broad spectrum of decisions was issued by lower courts re-
101. See id at 352.
102. See id at 351-52; supra text accompanying note 96.
103. L. TRIBE, supra note 38, at 381.
104. See French, Fruit and Vegetable Marketing Orders: A Critique of the Issues and
State of Analysis, 64 AM. J. AGR. ECON. 916, 917 (1982); Jamison, Marketing Orders and
Public Policyfor the Fruit and Vegetable Industries, 10 STAN. FOOD RES. INST. STUD. 229,
233-34 (1971); NAT'L COMM'N ON FOOD MARKETING, ORGANIZATION AND COMPETITION
IN THE FRUIT AND VEGETABLE INDUSTRY, ch. 12 (Tech. Study No. 4, 1966); D. MINAMI, B.
FRENCH, G. KING, AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF MARKET CONTROL IN THE CALIFORNIA
CLING PEACH INDUSTRY (Univ. of Cal. Div. of Agric. Sci., Giannini Found. Monograph
No. 39, 1979).
In spite of the fact that the primary effect of the law is to enable California growers to
exploit American consumers, a 1976 amendment requires that the advisory boards that
make the policy be made up of producers and handlers, and disingenuously asserts that their
interest is the public interest. The statutory language states: "It is hereby declared as a
matter of legislative determination, that the producers, or handlers, or both producers and
handlers, appointed to any advisory board pursuant to this article are intended to represent
and further the interest of a particular agricultural industry concerned, and that such repre-
sentation and furtherance is intended to serve the public interest. Accordingly, the Legisla-
ture finds that, with respect to persons who are appointed to such advisory boards, the
particular agricultural industry concerned is tantamount to, and constitutes, the public gen-
erally within the meaning of Section 87103 of the Government Code." 1976 Cal. Stat., ch.
1428, CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 58852 (West Supp. 1983).
105. See, e.g., Handler, Current Attack, supra note 9; Slater, Antitrust and Government
Action: A Formula/or Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 71, 81 (1974).
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garding the state action defense to the Sherman Act. Some have ig-
nored the limiting dictum of Parker and have held that express
regulation by state public utility commissions mandating, in effect, pri-
vate antitrust violations creates Sherman Act immunity. 0 6 One court
went so far as to hold that mere failure of a state regulatory agency to
consider practices alleged to be antitrust violations was implied con-
sent, and therefore the anticompetitive acts were considered to be state
action." 7' A district court even held a municipal ordinance granting a
monopoly of taxicab stands on the public streets to be immune from
Sherman Act attack.'08 These cases were additionally distinguishable
from Parker in that neither states nor state officers were defendants
therein.
Other lower courts have taken an opposite approach. They have
read Parker v. Brown in its narrowest import to give state action an
exemption only when the state has substantially administered the an-
ticompetitive program. When a North Carolina statute authorized to-
bacco warehousemen to form local tobacco boards of trade, and one
board adopted a rule allocating selling time among warehouses, the
state action defense was denied. 1 9 Without state supervision, this was
merely private action masquerading as that of the state. 10 When a
state insurance department had the power to set insurance premiums
and rates, but no power to approve anticompetitive means, preferential
rates received by one insurer from hospitals were not directed by the
state and not immune from antitrust laws.' When one equipment
company persuaded the public engineer to specify standards for public
swimming pools which were met only by that firm's patented equip-
ment, antitrust immunity was denied because the state had failed to
make a determination that competition was not the legal goal for that
field." '2 When a state commission had full regulatory power over
106. See, e.g., Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975); Business Aides,
Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 480 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1973); Gas Light Co. v.
Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972).
107. See Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 252
(4th Cir. 1971).
108. See Independent Taxicab Operators Ass'n v. Yellow Cab Co., 278 F. Supp. 979
(N.D. Cal. 1968).
109. See Asheville Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. F.T.C., 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959). An action
under the Federal Trade Commission Act is not within the technical definition of antitrust
laws. See Federal Trade Commission Act § 44, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
110. See.Asheville Bd of Trade, 263 F.2d at 509. See also Bale v. Glasgow Bd. of Trade,
Inc., 339 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1964).
111. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 298 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
112. See George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (Ist
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
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trucking, a charge of monopolization of certificated delivery to stores
was held to be merely approved by the state, and not state action im-
mune from operation of antitrust law." 3 The mere filing of telephone
tariffs with the state commission and compliance therewith was not suf-
ficient state action to create antitrust immunity
1 1 4
B. Critique of Recent Cases
With the decisions reviewed above and other conflicting lower
court decisions accumulating on the state action defense," 5 the
Supreme Court finally agreed to review the state action doctrine of
Parker. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,"6 a minimum-fee schedule
for lawyers published by the Fairfax County Bar Association and en-
forced by the Virginia State Bar was held to violate section 1 of the
Sherman Act." 7 The County Bar was a private group, while the Vir-
ginia State Bar was a state administrative agency. Without mention of
the Supremacy Clause and its control over statutes and statutory inter-
pretation, the Court felt bound to follow Parker: "The threshold in-
quiry in determining if an anticompetitive activity is state action of the
type the Sherman Act was not meant to proscribe is whether the activ-
ity is required by the State acting as sovereign.""' The Court found
that neither the Virginia Supreme Court nor the state legislature had
compelled, or even approved, the price fixing behavior. The fact that
the State Bar was a state agency for some purposes did not create an
antitrust shield which would allow it to initiate a scheme to foster an-
ticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members.
From the viewpoint of the Supremacy Clause, the key distinction
propounded in Goldfarb is irrelevant. Even if the Virginia legislature
or the Virginia Supreme Court had commanded private price fixing,
the action of the Bar Association would still be in direct conflict with
the Sherman Act's per se rule against price fixing." 9 An injunction
against the state's compulsion of anticompetitive behavior would have
113. See Marnell v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
114. See Macom Products Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 359 F. Supp. 973 (C.D.
Cal. 1973).
115. See, e.g., Wainright v. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 567 (D.C. Ga. 1969);
Schenley Indus., Inc. v. N.J. Wine & Spirit Wholesalers Ass'n, 272 F..Supp. 872 (D.C. NJ.
1967).
116. 421 U.S. 773 (1975), reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 886 (1975).
117. 421 U.S. at 781-83.
118. Id at 790 (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at 350-52; Continental Co. v. Union
Carbide, 370 U.S. 690, 706-07 (1962)).
119. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
been appropriate. Instead, in Goldfarb, a general state action defense
to antitrust enforcement was perpetuated.
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. 120 provided the Supreme Court with
its first opportunity to review a state action defense to antitrust enforce-
ment in which the defendants were not state officers since the Olsen v.
Smith case of 1904.121 Cantor involved an action by a retail druggist
for injunction and treble damages against a regulated electric utility,
charging the utility with monopolization in the retailing of light bulbs.
In an attempt to promote the sale of electricity, defendant supplied fifty
percent of the standard size light bulbs sold in its area. Its rates, omit-
ting any separate charge for bulbs (free bulb exchange), were approved
by the Michigan Public Service Commission and could be changed
only after the filing of a new tariff. The legal issue was "whether the
Parker rationale immunize[d] private action which ha[d] been ap-
proved by a State and which must be continued while the state ap-
proval remain[ed] effective."'" Reversing the district and circuit
courts, the Supreme Court, by a vote of six to three, answered in the
negative.
Justice Stevens, in an opinion for a plurality of four Justices, nar-
rowly limited the defense in Parker to suits against state officials."2
The price fixing administered by state officials in Parker was distin-
guished from the state regulatory approval of alleged monopolization
in Cantor. The dissent noted, however, that the effect of limiting
Parker to nonliability of state officials executing state actions "would
trivialize that case to the point of overruling it."' 4
Two concurring and three dissenting Justices rejected the view that
Parker was limited to the nonliability of state officials executing state
actions. 25 They viewed the immunity in Parker as centering on the
anticompetitive activity rather than on the identity of the defendants.
26
Thus, a majority found Cantor not to be governed byParker. A major-
ity of five held that Parker and other earlier decisions had "already
decided that state authorization, approval, encouragement, or partici-
pation in restrictive private conduct confers no antitrust immunity."' 7
120. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
121. 195 U.S. 332 (1904). See supra text accompanying notes 65-68.
122. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 581.
123. Id at 591.
124. Id at 616 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
125. See id at 604 (Burger, CJ., concurring), 609-10 (Blackmun, J., concurring), 616-17
(Stewart, J., joined by Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
126. See id at 604 (Burger, CJ., concurring), 610-12 (Blackmun, J., concurring), 619-21
(Stewart, J., joined by Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
127. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 592-93.
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In Cantor, mere approval by the regulatory commission of electricity
rates which included "free" light bulbs was insufficient to confer anti-
trust immunity.
The majority in Cantor were of the opinion that commission ap-
proval and the inability to change prices until the filing of a new tariff,
might have created immunity only if one of two additional facts were
proven. First, immunity would be proper if the utility had done nothing
more than obey the command of the state sovereign, for it would be
"unjust to conclude that. . . [it had] thereby offended federal law."
1 28
Second, an exemption might exist if it could be shown that Congress
did not intend to superimpose antitrust laws upon a state-regulated in-
dustry "as an additional, and perhaps conflicting, regulatory
mechanism."
129
The utility in Cantor participated in creating the bulb exchange
program, and hence, had done more than merely obey state com-
mand.13 0 As to the second possible ground for immunity, the Court
found that the state's regulatory scheme for electricity was distinguish-
able from the essentially unregulated program of light bulb marketing.
Michigan's regulation of its electric utilities was not in conflict with
federal antitrust laws, and furthermore, to hold the bulb exchange pro-
gram violative of those laws would not impair the state's ability to ef-
fectively continue such regulation.1 3 1 Thus, neither of the excusing
facts was present. But if the Court had decided this case under the
Supremacy Clause, neither of these two grounds could excuse behavior
directly conflicting with the Sherman Act.
If the light bulb exchange program was ultimately found to be an
act of monopolizing, the remedy of injunction would be appropriate.
But, as Justice Stewart wrote for the dissenters, award of treble dam-
ages against a regulated utility whose rates have been approved by a
regulatory commission seems inequitable. 3 2 The alleged violation of
the antitrust laws by monopolizing is not illegal per se, but is subject to
defenses under the rule of reason. Detroit Edison acted in good faith
that its free bulb exchange practice was a reasonable restraint of trade
because it was approved by the Michigan Public Service Commission.
This should have rebutted any allegation of intent to illegally monopo-
lize. In fact, upon remand, the case was settled and damages were
128. Id. at 592.
129. Id
130. See id at 594.
131. See id at 598.
132. See id at 615, 624-28 (Stewart, J., joined by Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
paid. 133
In Bates v. State Bar,1 34 the state action defense of Parker was
reaffirmed by a unanimous Supreme Court. Two Arizona lawyers were
suspended from practice for advertising their services in violation of a
disciplinary rule of the Arizona Supreme Court. While the Arizona
rule was held to violate the First Amendment,1 31 it was held not to
violate the Sherman Act.
1 36
State action immunity was upheld because the rule prohibiting ad-
vertising was commanded by the state. The Court found that the real
party in interest was the Arizona Supreme Court, since it adopted and
enforced the disciplinary rules at issue; the bar association was viewed
as an "agent of the court under its continuous supervision."1 37 Gold-
farb and Cantor were distinguished, since the anticompetitive behavior
in those cases had not been compelled by the state. In Goldfarb, the
minimum fees were set by the local and state bars acting independent
of either the state legislature or supreme court. In Cantor, no state
officials were defendants since the bulb exchange was initiated by the
privately owned utility and merely approved, not compelled, by the
state regulatory commission. In contrast, the Court in Bates noted that
"[t]he disciplinary rules reflect a clear articulation of the State's policy
with regard to professional behavior."
13 8
In Bates, as in the earlier cases, the state action issue was not
framed in terms of the Supremacy Clause. A blatantly anticompetitive
rule, promulgated by the state, was held immune from antitrust action
merely because of its official status.
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. 139 was the first of
two recent state action cases that did not have to reach the issue of the
Parker doctrine because agencies created by the state, as distinct from
the state itself, were held not entitled to the defense. City of Lafayette
concerned the private treble damage liability of cities acting as proprie-
tors and not as sovereign regulators. The city-owned utilities had sued
a private utility under the antitrust laws and the private utility counter-
claimed, charging predatory practices by plaintiffs. The cities asserted
133. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 86 F.R.D. 752, 756 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
134. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
135. See id at 363-64.
136. See id at 359-63. The action, like Parker, was not initially argued under the anti-
trust laws, and it was only upon review of the attorneys' suspensions in the Arizona Supreme
Court that the antitrust issue was raised.
137. Id at 361.
138. Id at 362.
139. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
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the state action defense to the counterclaim and the Supreme Court, in
a five-to-four decision, held it not applicable in this case. First, the
Court held that the acts of the cities were proprietary and not govern-
mental. 140 The economic objectives of a municipal utility, designed for
their own community, might not comport with the national economic
well-being incorporated in the antitrust laws.
141
Second, the Court held that the state action immunity applies only
to states qua states and not necessarily to their political subdivisions.
In City of Lafayette, the predatory acts of the cities had not been di-
rected by the state, nor were they the result of an express, narrowly
defined agency authority granted to the cities by the state.1 42  The
Court concluded that "the Parker doctrine exempts only anticompeti-
tive conduct engaged in as an act of government by the State as sover-
eign, or, by its subdivisions, pursuant to state policy to displace
competition with regulation or monopoly public service."' 43 This rule
was reiterated in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder.1"
The first issue in City of Lafayette, upholding the liability of gov-
ernments as proprietors, was correctly based on statutory interpretation
of the Sherman Act. The second issue would not have been material if
the Court had rejected Parker and followed the constitutional ap-
proach suggested here.
In New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co. ,145 an anticom-
petitive state statute enacted at the behest of a combination of retailers
was approved under the rule of Parker. The California Automobile
Franchise Act required auto manufacturers to secure approval of the
state New Motor Vehicle Board before franchising a new dealer or
relocating an old one, if any existing dealer in that line and make of car
within a ten mile radius protested the new competition."46 The manu-
facturer would be notified of the protest and barred from franchising
140. Id at 403-04. The precedents established that cities and states had been held to be
persons under the treble damage sections of the Sherman and Clayton Acts and allowed to
sue as plaintiffs. Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe
Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906). If they could sue as plaintiff purchasers, it
was only reasonable that in turn they could be sued as defendant proprietors.
141. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 403.
142. See id at 414.
143. Id at 413.
144. 455 U.S. 40 (1982) (holding a municipal ordinance prohibiting expansion of a cable
television company under a city's home rule power not to be either action of the state in its
sovereign capacity or municipal action implementing clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy).
145. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
146. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 3062, 3063 (West Supp. 1982).
the new dealer until after a hearing and a finding of no good cause to
bar it. Since there was no time limit on the duration of the hearing and
subsequent handing down of a determination, a protest could bar entry
of a new dealer for months. Since over ninety-nine percent of the pro-
tests were ultimately denied, 147 the key operative feature of the statute
was the unilateral power of existing dealers to delay entry of rivals.
This case centered on General Motors' charge that the delay was a
form of temporary injunction in violation of the Due Process Clause. 148
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the statute on all
counts, including a charge of conflict with the Sherman Act. The
Supreme Court held that, in spite of a conflict between the Automobile
Franchise Act and the Sherman Act, there was state immunity under
the rules ofParker and Bates. 49 The Court stated that the "Act's regu-
latory scheme is a system of regulation, clearly articulated and affirma-
tively expressed, designed to displace unfettered business freedom in
the matter of the establishment and relocation of automobile dealer-
ships. The regulation is therefore outside the reach of the antitrust laws
under the 'state action' exemption."
150
The state action immunity was operative because the scheme of
regulation was mandated by state legislation and supervised by state
officers. The Supremacy Clause and its significance to federal-state
conflict was not mentioned.
With this series of decisions as a background, the Court in 1980
decided Calfornia Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Alumi-
num, Inc. 151 The California Code provided for filing of resale con-
tracts or price schedules for wine with a state agency. If producers did
not set prices through resale price contracts, wholesalers were required
to post price schedules. 152 Midcal was charged with reselling twenty-
seven cases of wine for prices below those set by the Gallo winery.
Midcal stipulated that the allegations were true and filed a writ of man-
date in the California Court of Appeal to enjoin the state's wine pricing
system. The appellate court held for Midca115 3 and the California
147. See New Motor Vehicle Bd, 439 U.S. at 110 n.14.
148. See id at 104-09.
149. See id at 109. If the horizontal combination effected in this case had been executed
without state legislative sanction, it would have been illegal per se under section 1 of the
Sherman Act. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 145 (1966).
150. New Motor Vehicle Bd, 439 U.S. at 109.
151. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
152. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 24866(a)-(b) (West 1964) (repealed 1980).
153. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. v. Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 153 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1979).
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Supreme Court declined to review the case.' 54 The U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari and subsequently affirmed the California
Court of Appeal.
It was clear that the California resale price maintenance for wine
violated the Sherman Act.155 The issue was whether there was immu-
nity under Parker. 56 The Court reviewed these decisions and noted
that they established two requirements for antitrust immunity.157 The
first, a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy of set-
ting prices, was found in this case. The second requirement, that a
price fixing program be actively supervised by a state agency, was lack-
ing. The state neither set the prices nor reviewed the reasonableness of
the price schedules. Furthermore, the state did not regulate the terms
of the resale price contracts. Finally, the state did not monitor market
conditions or engage in any pointed reexamination of the program.
Consequently, antitrust immunity was denied. The California Court of
Appeal had taken this same approach, following the 1978 decision of
the California Supreme Court in Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Ap-
peals Board,158 which had challenged the resale price statutes for dis-
tilled liquors.
It could be argued that the governance of the industry by the pro-
ducers was essentially the same in Calfornia RetailLiquors as it was in
Parker. The difference was that in Calfornia Retail Liquors the statute
did not provide for state supervision of the prices. But again, the issue
154. 2 CAL. Sup. CT. SERV. (AM. INST. OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., INC.) No. 22 at
1147 (June 1, 1979).
155. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n, 445 U.S. at 102-03. The Miller-Tydings Act
and the McGuire Act were repealed by the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L.
94-145, § 2, 89 Stat. 801. As to the per se illegality of vertical price fixing with material
horizontal impact, see United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
156. 445 U.S. at 103. The other contention of the state was that the Twenty-First
Amendment barred application of the Sherman Act. See Comment, California Retail Li-
quor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.: Federal Power Under the Twenty-First
Amendment, 38 WASH. AND LEE L. REv. 302 (1981). The second section of the amendment
protected the state's power to regulate the transportation or importation of intoxicating li-
quors. Under this power, states could regulate internal distribution of alcoholic beverages.
But the issue here was a purported conflict between national antitrust laws promulgated
under the Commerce Clause on the one hand, and state laws enacted pursuant to the
amendment, on the other. The Court noted the findings of the California Supreme Court in
the case of Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 457, 579 P.2d
4.76, 494, 146 Cal. Rptr. 585, 602 (1978)--that alleged protection of small retailers was not
effective and was less substantial than the national policy in favor of competition. 445 U.S.
at 113. Hence the amendment provided no shelter for violation of the Sherman Act. Id at
114.
157. 445 U.S. at 105.
158. 21 Cal. 3d 431, 579 P.2d 476, 146 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1978).
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of the Supremacy Clause was not before the courts. The questionable
decision in Parker remains the standard.
The most recent case on state-sponsored private cartels did not
reach the issue of the state action defense under Parker because the
Supreme Court reversed the lower court ruling that the activities vio-
lated the Sherman Act. Rice v. Norman Williams Co. 159 concerned the
marketing of distilled spirits in California. After the decision in Rice v.
lcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board ---that state resale price
maintenance for distilled spirits violated the Sherman Act-organized
wholesalers and retailers had searched for alternative techniques to
limit competition. Those liquor wholesalers who wished to engage in
price competition could buy branded liquors from Oklahoma wholesal-
ers (whose local law promoted price competition), and resell them to
California retailers at below the suggested wholesale prices of the dis-
tillers. In order to stop this price competition, the California legislature
amended the Business and Professions Code so that a California im-
porter could not import any brand of distilled spirits from any source
unless the brand owner designated him an authorized importer.161 The
effect of the law was to create a barrier to entry into liquor marketing
by allowing a brand owner who had passed title in liquor to wholesal-
ers to prevent them from reselling to persons not designated as author-
ized importers in California.
Upon petition by certain nondesignated importers, the California
court issued a writ of mandate holding that the designation statute vio-
lated the Sherman Antitrust Act. 62 While the distiller's statutory
power to forbid others to sell to a nondesignated importer did not fit
any of the traditional categories of per se illegality,163 the California
court ruled that it was nevertheless invalid: "A more clear power to
restrain interstate trade is difficult to imagine."'" The Supreme Court
159. 102 S. Ct. 3294 (1982).
160. 21 Cal. 3d 431, 579 P.2d 476, 146 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1978).
161. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23672 (West Supp. 1983), as amended, reads as follows:
"A licensed importer shall not purchase or accept delivery of any brand of distilled spirits
unless he is designated as an authorized importer of such brand by the brand owner or his
authorized agent. Such distilled spirits imported into California shall come to rest at the
warehouse of the licensed importer or an authorized warehouse for the account of such
licensed importer, before sale and delivery to a retail licensee."
162. Norman Williams Co. v. Rice, 108 Cal. App. 3d 348, 362, 166 Cal. Rptr. 563, 573
(1980).
163. See id at 356, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
164. Id This control by the owner of a trademark of entry into the market by parties not
in privity of contract with him is analogous to the enforcement of resale price maintenance
against nonsigners. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951)
and text accompanying notes 73-76.
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reversed the decision, but did not reach the issue of whether the statute
was immune from federal antitrust laws under Parker. It cited the
Supremacy Clause and held that the test was whether there existed an
irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state regulatory
schemes. 165
The Supreme Court held that the designation statute was not ille-
gal on its face, but was subject to the rule of reason under Continental
T V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 166 The rule in that case was extended
here to a vertical control on entry into the market. The designation
statute was not illegal on its face because it did not require any distiller
to utilize it in a manner that would exclude any wholesaler as a Califor-
nia importer.167 On the other hand, plaintiff may still prove at trial
either: (1) that a horizontal combination in the Wine Spirits Wholesal-
ers of California provoked passage of the designation statute and has a
part in its administration, or (2) that the statute is used as a tool for
illegal price fixing. In either case, the operation of the statute would be
found to be an indirect method of horizontal combination and hence
would be held illegal per se under the Sherman Act.
Since the case was remanded to determine if the application of the
statute was an unreasonable restraint of trade, the Court did not have
to consider whether the statute might be saved from invalidation under
Parker.6 ' The case is nevertheless significant, as it is the first state
action opinion in the Supreme Court to note explicitly that the issues
arise under the Supremacy Clause. On a subsequent appeal, Norman
Williams could be the case that gives full treatment to the issue of na-
tional preemption.
Conclusion
Every conflict between the purpose of promoting competition em-
bodied in the national antitrust laws and state efforts to implement an-
165. See Norman Williams Co., 102 S. Ct. 3294, 3299 (1982). An injunction against en-
forcement will be entered only if the statute on its face irreconcilably conflicts with federal
antitrust policy.
166. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). GTE Sylvania held that vertical territorial restrictions were not
illegal per se and thus were subject to the rule of reason analysis under § 1 of the Sherman
Act. Id at 47-59.
167. The Court contrasted the statute in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Mid-
cal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980), which on its face required illegal resale price main-
tenance. See Norman Williams Co., 102 S. Ct. at 3299.
168. The Court denied additional defenses not pertinent to this study. The statute was
held not to be preempted by § 5A of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, not to deny
plaintiffs due process of law, and not to violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Norman
Williams Co., 102 S. Ct. at 3301-02.
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ticompetitive economic regulation can be framed as a constitutional
issue under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. Legal argument
would then center on application of.the language in Article VI-com-
paring the mandate of the Sherman Act to that of the state law in ques-
tion. The constitutional language bans conflicting state law. The
Sherman Act, like most federal laws, did not expressly treat the issue of
conflicting state law. Since the Constitution mandates the supremacy
of federal law, such exclusionary clauses are unnecessary. Under this
reasoning, the classic state action decision of Parker v. Brown is wrong.
The Supreme Court's questionable finding of an unexpressed congres-
sional intent in the Sherman Act not to preempt all conflicting state
regulatory law, violated the Supremacy Clause. The Court's decision
to give statutory interpretation priority over constitutional interpreta-
tion offended the essential character of constitutional government. In
our legal system, federal supremacy is not an option to be chosen by
the courts.
The only way out of the antitrust maze created by the Supreme
Court in the state action defense is to return to the logic of higher law,
the mandate of the Supremacy Clause. The first step is for the Court to
acknowledge its error in Parker and overrule it. The second step would
be automatic, for every trial court which met the state action defense
would require full briefs on application of the Supremacy Clause. If
counsel have neglected the fundamental aspect of the state action de-
fense, the courts should not.
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